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Two sides of the human condition 
 
In my first year as an undergraduate two things drew me into psychology and made 
me passionate about the subject. Now, over 35 years later, they make me 
passionate still. 
 
The first experience was hearing Henri Tajfel lecture. In these days of assessments and 
league tables we often measure a teacher by what is easiest to measure: the 
provision of good lecture handouts, clear course objectives and aims, clear 
feedback and so on. What Henri had was the capacity to inspire, the ability to make 
you care about the questions and therefore motivate you to find out the answers. 
The questions he asked — about group bias, about intergroup hatred, and above 
all, how can we explain (and perhaps help contain) real life atrocities — derived 
from his own past as a Polish Jew in the Second World War. And they touched on my 
past, for my family too are Jewish and my father came from Poland. 
 
The second experience may seem mundane, even trivial, by comparison. But it 
marked me just as deeply. At about the same time as I was learning about group 
processes, the Student‘s Union voted to occupy the University administration 
buildings in support of a demand for nursery provision. Coming from a nice polite 
middle-class background I wasn‘t sure about occupations and I was a little scared 
of getting mixed up with those extremists so castigated in the media and whom my 
parents had warned me about. I was also afraid of how the University might respond 
(and indeed the University did try, unsuccessfully, to expel several of those involved). 
But in the end I felt that if I had participated in the debate and the vote, I had to 
accept the decision and so I spent the next few days and nights in Bristol University‘s 
Senate House. 
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It was the most remarkable few days for me. I had never known so many people 
debate so seriously and so intensely about something that would give them no 
personal benefit. The issue may have been a nursery, but the cause was equal 
access to University for women. And we talked long into the night about how to 
publicise and spread and win our cause. There was an intellectual intensity I had 
hoped to find in everyday student discussions – but hadn‘t. There was a sense of 
principle which I had been led to believe in but generally seen honoured in the 
breach. There was a sense of warmth and generosity between people that I 
remember still. Yet, when others (such as the University Vice-Chancellor) spoke of us, 
it was in terms of a very old pathologising language of ‗the mob‘. We were, he said, 
the gullible led by the culpable: immature students carried away in the group and 
exploited by seasoned activists. 
 
These two experiences, then, invoke the two sides of group psychology and 
underline the fact that groups create both the worst of worlds and the best of 
worlds. On the one hand, groups can dominate, denigrate, dehumanize and even 
destroy others. On the other hand, groups not only lead to bonds of care and 
solidarity internally, they also challenge and destroy systems of inequality between 
groups. Indeed, to borrow the old Trades Union slogan, the power of the powerless 
lies in their combination. Take away the ability to combine and hierarchy (or even 
tyranny) will always remain secure. 
 
To make the same point slightly differently and more generally, psychology — social 
psychology in particular, group psychology especially — needs to address both 
domination and resistance, stasis and movement, social reproduction and social 
change. Any approach which emphasizes the one to the exclusion of the other will 
necessarily be deficient in its ability to explain both. It may be that, over long periods 
of time, our social worlds seem stable and set and that their inequalities are destined 
to last. But change — underpinned by collective action — is always possible and 
should warn us against eternalizing what is generally only a temporary lull. Perhaps 
right now, when seemingly strong states like Tunisia and Egypt have folded like a 
pack of cards and who knows how many others will follow in their wake, this point 
should be easier to make than at other times. But the same might have been said in 
1789, 1830, 1848, 1871, 1917, 1968, 1989. Yet we seem to have short memories. This 
point at least tends regularly to be forgotten. 
 
This is an argument I have developed with Alex Haslam, and what follows has arisen 
out of our joint discussions and our joint work. It is as much Alex‘s as my own. 
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Naturalising inequality 
 
The tendency to naturalise the social order, thereby to exclude social change and 
to make resistance futile, is as old as recorded social thought. Yet, in different ages, 
and under different social orders, the form of naturalization changes. We well 
remember Plato‘s division of humanity into men (and only men) of gold, men of 
silver, and men of bronze, each destined to fill different places in the social order. As 
Plato puts it (or at least, as Plato has Socrates explain to his pupil Adeimantus) only a 
tiny number of people are born with the intellectual and moral qualities to rule over 
the brutish mass (Plato, 380BC/1993). While vestiges of this sort of idea survive to this 
day (see, for instance, Leon Kamin‘s work on justifications of racial inequality and, in 
particular his magnificent 1993 essay with the irresistible title ‗On the length of black 
penises and the depth of white racism‘) such blatant elitism is generally out of favour 
in today‘s more democratic times. We tend to favour explanations which assign 
certain characteristics to all human beings — characteristics which make us naturally 
suited to the world as it is and which reduce any alternative to a hopeless fantasy.  
 
A combination of the (mis)use of evolutionary theorizing and the reductive use of 
powerful new technologies such as brain imaging has led to claims that everything 
from selfishness and exploitation to conflict and aggression are somehow inscribed 
into the human psyche (e.g. Buss, 2005; Dawkins, 1976; Pinker, 2002).  However, if one 
natural difference between types of people survives, it has to do with gender. Men, it 
seems, are not only ‗naturally‘ more aggressive and exploitative than women, it is 
natural for men to dominate, exploit, and even rape women (Thornhill & Palmer, 
2001). 
 
In part, at least, the growing influence of such naturalizing accounts can be put 
down to the decline of large scale social psychological studies of human behavior.  
Gradually, as the great field studies of the post-war period produced more and 
more spectacular evidence of the ways in which context could affect behavior, 
they raised more and more acute ethical issues about the acceptability of 
manipulating our social worlds. Already, in his ‗boys camp studies‘, Muzafer Sherif 
had shown how you can take well-adjusted and decent young boys and turn them 
to violence and aggression. The Sherifs (Muzafer and his wife Carolyn) famously 
issued ―a warning to psychologists to consider fully the importance of the 
background and the context of behavior in a social situation‖ (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, 
p. 252). They continued:  ―If an outside observer had entered the situation after the 
conflict began… he could only have concluded on the basis of their behaviour that 
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these boys (who were the ‗cream of the crop‘ in their communities) were either 
disturbed, vicious or wicked youngsters‖. (1969, p. 254).  
 
In 1961 (we celebrate the half-centenary this year) Stanley Milgram went on to show 
how contextual manipulations could have as much impact on adults as on children 
and could lead ordinary Americans to deliver what they believed to be lethal 
electric shocks to another in a mock learning experiment. In 1971, Philip Zimbardo 
went even further and turned Californian students into either sadistic guards or else 
disturbed prisoners in his Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE).  
 
Enough was enough. Zimbardo‘s prison was so toxic that the two week study had to 
be halted after only six days. But more seriously, for the ensuing 40 years, it has been 
all but impossible to run such powerful studies again (though see Reicher & Haslam, 
2006 and www.bbcprisonstudy.org). Indeed, over time, we have not only retreated 
almost entirely into the laboratory, we have even eliminated interaction from the 
studies we conduct there (Haslam, & McGarty, 2001). The problem, then, if we 
cannot set up new and immersive social worlds in order to see how they impact 
upon people, is that other asocial explanations will prevail. It may be that anyone 
who sees just how dramatically someone can be turned from passivity to aggressivity 
by the circumstances they find themselves in (that is, someone who has access to 
the type of history whereby Sherif‘s youngsters were transformed from ‗the cream of 
the crop‘ to vicious antagonist) will never again be satisfied with static explanations 
of the phenomena. However, if we cannot see, or if that history is denied to us, then 
our explanations will likewise become skewed towards stasis. 
 
Conformity bias in classic social psychology 
 
But I am being too kind to my own. The problem isn‘t only that social psychology has 
been usurped from the outside. It also lies within social psychology itself. For, while 
the great field studies may have demonstrated the power of context, and hence 
shown how altered contexts lead to altered behaviours, they also went further (or, at 
least, they have generally been interpreted as going further). They have been used 
to argue that context is so powerful that it obliterates the individual, that people 
cannot resist the circumstances in which they find themselves and that they can only 
conform.  
 
Empirically, then, these studies impose particular contextual conditions upon 
participants. They don‘t address how people create or transform contexts for 
themselves – and even when they do (so, for instance, in Sherif‘s 1954 ‗Robber‘s 
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Cave boys camp study, the boys wanted to create competition as soon as they 
learnt of the existence of another group and before competitions were organized by 
the experimenters) this is generally ignored in the analysis. Thus context becomes 
something external to participants which contains and constrain show they 
(inter)act. It is not something that emerges out of these interactions themselves. 
 
This neglect is underpinned by theoretical approaches which, either by omission or 
by commission, deny agency to people especially in collective contexts. Thus, either 
a straight line is drawn from context to action as if people will always behave in set 
ways within a given context or else it is claimed that when people are engaged with 
others, they lose their capacity for critical judgment, they become thoughtless and 
they simply go along with whatever is suggested to them. This latter approach is 
common both to Milgram‘s ‗agentic state‘ account of the obedience studies 
(Milgram, 1974) and Zimbardo‘s role account of the Stanford Prison Experiment 
(Zimbardo, 2008). The difference is that, in Milgram‘s account, these suggestions 
require a leader to be present whereas in Zimbardo‘s account they are generated 
by the role itself without anyone being needed to spell out how one should act. 
 
As Moscovici (1976) noted, the conceptual problem with such a monolithic 
‗conformity bias‘ approach is that it leaves us with a one-sided social and group 
psychology. It invokes the power of the group context while at the same time 
pathologising group psychology. It stresses the power of immersion in groups to 
make people behave in toxic ways but it doesn‘t stress the power of the group to 
challenge toxic situations. It dramatizes domination but it downplays resistance. And 
to realize that all this is a problem, one doesn‘t have to make claims about the 
nature of the wider society. One can simply look at these classic studies themselves. 
For even if it is ignored in practice and denied in theory, all of them are dripping with 
resistance! 
 
In the boys camp studies, for instance, the attempts to divide groups of boys and set 
them up in competition against each other was not always successful. The second 
study, in 1953, resulted in the two groups getting together and refusing to believe 
that the other was their antagonist. This study was abandoned and never fully written 
up. As so often, those who challenge the reality of the experimenter are not used to 
study how people make their own history. Rather they are written out of (the official 
scientific) history. 
 
In Milgram‘s studies, the rate of obedience varied from 0% to 100%. So in effect they 
are studies of disobedience as much as obedience and the question needs to be 
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less ‗why do people obey‘ than ‗when do people obey‘. These rather obvious points 
are somewhat obscured by the fact that, even if not entirely obliterated, the focus 
has been somewhat removed from the disobedient cases. In part this comes from 
reducing the complexity of the results by focusing on one version (dubbed the 
‗standard‘ version for no particularly good reason; Russell, 2011) which tends to be 
cited in textbook accounts and in which the clear majority of people do comply 
(Reicher & Haslam, 2011). In part it comes from Milgram‘s skills as a film maker and 
the fact that he only made available film of the compliant trials (Millard, 2010). These 
pictures, by now old and flickering, literally dominate the field. They perpetuate a 
misleading image of monolithic conformity. They stop us asking us about the ‗when‘ 
and lead us back to asking only why people obey. 
 
And when it comes to the Stanford Prison Experiment, it is hard to know where to 
start with tales of resistance. The prisoners resisted their roles from the start. At the end 
of the first day they were united and dominated the Guards. Until the very end, 
some prisoners continued to resist even if they had now become isolated. The 
Guards also resisted their roles. As Zimbardo himself acknowledges, some actively 
helped the prisoners, some were firm but fair, only a few were actively malicious. 
Indeed the evidence of mistreatment relates almost exclusively to one individual 
dubbed ‗John Wayne‘ for his aggressive swagger (Zimbardo, 1989). So, once more, 
a balanced account needs certainly to ask about domination. But it also needs to 
ask about resistance. Above all, it needs to ask what determines which 
predominates and which prevails; Haslam & Reicher, 2006, 2010). 
 
Conformity bias in contemporary social psychology 
 
These classics, of course, are now (as the term itself suggests) part of our history. Even 
if there has been little challenge to the conceptual account of the studies 
themselves, in the discipline as a whole such notions as agentic state or role 
immersion hold little sway. But I use these less for their own importance as exemplars 
of ‗conformity bias‘ approaches. And, if anything, such approaches have gained 
increasing sway in recent years. Take, for instance, the recent rise of system 
justification theory (e.g. Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). The notion of system justification 
is originally taken from Henri Tajfel‘s work (Tajfel, 1981). In Tajfel‘s hands, this is but one 
of several functions of social stereotypes. Moreover, his interest (and the focus of his 
social identity theory) lies precisely in the structural and ideological dynamics which 
determine precisely when members of subordinated groups will accept an unequal 
status quo and when they will begin to challenge it (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, 
once the notion of system justification is inflated into a theory, all balance is lost and 
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a construct which was meant to help us understand dynamic social processes is 
used to impede an understanding of such dynamics. The argument becomes lop-
sided again. The claim is that people have inherent tendencies to buy into their own 
oppression and that we cannot help but bolster the status quo. Sad, perhaps, but 
that is the way we are built (see Reicher, 2004). 
 
Similar points can be made about social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), 
another approach which has gained great traction over the last decade or so. 
Again, there is nothing problematic about the concept of social dominance in itself. 
Moreover, there is much that is constructive and attractive in the work of Sidanius, 
Pratto and others: to start with, they put issues of power and inequality back at the 
core of social psychology, they point to the role of institutions and states in 
buttressing inequality, they demonstrate the impact of hierarchical beliefs (Sidanius, 
van Laar, Levin & Sinclair, 2003). But the problem lies in the fact that, in social 
dominance theory, social dominance (like system justification in system justification 
theory)  is not seen as an ideology, which is articulated by particular groups at 
particular times and discarded at others (cf. Schmitt, Branscombe & Kappen, 2003). 
That is, it is not seen as a variable which is to be explained in terms of social 
processes. It is seen as a constant which serves to exclude social variation. To be less 
cryptic, social dominance is seen as a stable individual difference, but also a stable 
group difference (e.g. men are higher in social dominance than women – the ‗iron 
law of andrancy‘ as they term it) which is underpinned by evolution. Thus the theory 
openly claims that hierarchy, dominance and inequality are an inevitable aspect of 
the human condition (see, for instance the title of a 1993 chapter by Sidanius & 
Pratto: ―The inevitability of oppression and the dynamics of social dominance‖). In 
this way social dominance provides yet another analysis in that long line going back 
to Plato and beyond which tells us that resistance is futile. 
 
As I write this, I am reading at home the autobiography of an Indian Dalit 
(‗Untouchable‘) woman Baby Kamble, who grew up in the early part of the 
twentieth century (Kamble, 2008). Her book is really more of a sociobiography. It tells 
of the condition and the fate of one of the most oppressed groups on earth. It tells 
how the untouchables, the women in particular, were seen and treated as 
subhuman. They ate the slops of the higher castes who considered even the sound 
of their voice as polluting. It also tells how they accepted their position and 
embraced the Hindu religion which rejected them. But it also tells of change, of how 
‗untouchable‘ became politicized as Dalit. It relates how people joined the 
movement led by Dr. Ambedkar (a far greater figure than Gandhi to these people), 
how they refused to serve the higher castes in the villages and how they converted 
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en masse to Buddhism. The book is a cry of rage against a system and a religion 
which lays people low. But even more it is a cry against those ‗untouchables‘ who 
still try to assimilate to this system and still accept an ideology of hierarchy.  
 
Kamble‘s book is entitled ‗The Prisons We Broke‘. The language is echoed in John 
Turner‘s trenchant critique of conservative psychological theory. His immediate 
target was Zimbardo‘s role account of the Stanford Prison Study (Turner, 2006), but it 
applies more generally to the various models I have outlined above. Turner argues 
against theories which imprison us in the present by denying our ability to challenge 
authority and alter inequality. He calls for us to break our theoretical prisons just as 
Kamble calls on Dalits to break their ideological prisons. Moreover, the two are linked 
insofar as psychological theory can (and often has) become a key part of the 
ideology which seeks to keep people in their place whether by justifying inequality 
through the attribution of different qualities to different groups of people (Gould, 
1983; Kamin, 1977) or else (as I have stressed here) by ruling out any alternatives to 
the existing social order (Tajfel, 1978). 
 
In ‗escaping our theoretical prisons‘ (as Turner advocates), we don‘t just gain a 
deeper understanding of how change can occur, we also gain an understanding of 
how the status quo is maintained. Indeed, the irony is that, by making social 
reproduction natural and inevitable, we lose sight of all the work at different levels — 
including the psychological — which goes into ensuring that social systems endure 
over time. How is it that certain groups legitimate their privileged position? How do 
they stop subordinate groups coming together to challenge them? In a 
contemporary world where bankers continue to get bonuses while others (including 
those of us in the academic sector) lose jobs and services because of the crisis that 
the bankers caused, these are pertinent questions for us all. To quote the Governor 
of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, why is the public not angrier than it is? (quoted 
in ‗Should we be more angry about the causes of the financial crisis?‘ The Guardian, 
March 2nd 2011)? In order to answer this question we need what we plainly do not 
have: a social psychological analysis of the processes of domination. 
 
Viewed in this way, it is clear that the analysis of resistance and the analysis of 
domination are not separate orders of enquiry. Rather they are two sides of the 
same coin – or rather, they constitute different outcomes from the same process. 
Domination results from the successful demobilization of challenges to the status quo 
whereas resistance results from successful mobilization. Moreover, demobilization is 
achieved by getting people to adopt a common categorization with those who are 
dominant, or at least by stopping seeing themselves and acting as a distinct group 
with antagonistic interests (see Haslam & Reicher, 2011). Mobilization is achieved 
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precisely by creating a sense of autonomous selfhood amongst the subordinated in 
society — what in Marxist terms would be termed the group (specifically, class) for 
itself (für sich; Marx & Engels, 1848/2002).  
 
Domination and resistance in the Holocaust 
 
I started off by referring back to two formative experiences in my time as a 
psychologist — the Holocaust as a site of domination, an occupation as a site of 
resistance. But as time goes by, I become increasingly aware that as long as we 
separate out these issues and associate them with different phenomena, we miss the 
point. The point is that the same phenomena encapsulate both issues. One might 
well ask how can one study resistance as well as domination in the Holocaust? After 
all, the received wisdom is that the Holocaust was possible because people largely 
went like sheep to the slaughter, and if we occasionally focus on exceptions such as 
the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943, that is precisely because they are exceptions 
(Mais, 2007-8). 
 
But in recent years, this viewpoint has been challenged on several fronts. To start 
with, Warsaw was far from unique. There were armed undergrounds in more than 90 
ghettos (Gurewitsch, 2007-8) and there were armed uprisings in three of the six Nazi 
extermination camps: Auschwitz, Treblinka and Sobibor (Arad, 1987; Suhl, 1975; 
Venezia, 2007). What is more, resistance didn‘t only take the form of uprisings (in 
which a few of the fighters might conceivably survive, but the weaker members of 
the the ghetto would inevitably be killed). It took other forms such as escape and 
joining the partisans (Epstein, 2008; Marrus, 1995). More radically still, it has been 
argued that even those in the Jewish Councils who ran the ghettos cannot be 
assumed to be passive and collaborationist. Rather their stance was rooted in a 
historical experience of oppression and of successfully surviving that oppression by 
hunkering down, maintaining communal organization and seeking to outlive the 
oppressor — a strategy known as iberleben (Engel, 2007-8). Clearly this strategy 
failed, because Nazi exterminationism was something radically new. But it is only in 
hindsight that we know this. At the time how could anyone believe that the Nazis 
would do something so extreme, so unprecedented and so ridiculous to people who 
were working hard in ghetto factories for their war effort? (Horwitz, 2010).  
 
In effect, then, everyone sought to resist the Germans but used more of less 
confrontational strategies as a function of how they understood the nature of their 
oppressor (Einwohner, 2009; Tiedens, 1997). So if it is true that Jews were led to be 
slaughtered, they did not generally go as sheep. Moreover, it would be dismissive to 
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say that the resistance failed because most resistors died. Once they became aware 
of their fate, people sought to act in ways that would maintain Jewish dignity and 
empower Jewish people in the future. Whatever one‘s stance on the State of Israel, 
one should not underestimate the impact of Holocaust resistors on the success of 
subsequent struggles.  
 
I have just one more point to make about the Holocaust. It was precisely because 
they were aware of the potential for (and the reality of) resistance, that the Nazis 
went to such lengths to fragment Jewish solidarity. In the ghettos they went through 
countless elaborate charades to convince those left behind that deportations 
meant transfer to a better life rather than to certain death, a deception that they 
maintained even as people entered the camps and symbolized by the infamous 
sign over the gates to Auschwitz: ‗Arbeit Macht Frei‘ (Gutman, 1971; Horwitz, 2010). 
 
Once people were in the camps and the slaughter could no longer be hidden, other 
means were used to isolate people from the others whom were tightly packed 
together. Indeed the whole camp system was specifically design to stop people 
developing bonds of common identity and solidarity — the use of divide and rule, 
the system of preferments and privileges, the systematic use of humiliation and many 
other techniques besides (Sofsky, 1997; see also Haslam & Reicher, 2011). Passivity 
did not come naturally, it was actively produced. 
 
The Holocaust, then, is a site of domination and resistance. We cannot understand it 
without studying both. Nor can we understand either element without understanding 
the other. Unless we know what makes resistance effective we cannot tell what 
disrupts opposition and maintains the status quo. Unless we know what serves to 
maintain the status quo we cannot know what needs to be disrupted for resistance 
to flourish. 
 
As social psychologists, then, we must not counter the present unbalanced emphasis 
on domination by an equally unbalanced turn to resistance. We must study the two 
together. That is a major challenge. It is the challenge that brought me into 
psychology. It is the challenge which maintains my passion for our discipline. It is a 
challenge that will keep me busy for many years to come. 
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